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Based on converging research, we concluded that the controversial topic of unconscious 
blockage of psychological trauma –i.e., repressed memory- remains very much alive in clinical, 
legal, and academic contexts (Otgaar et al., 2019). In his commentary, Brewin (in press) 
conducted a co-citation analysis and concluded that scholars do not adhere to the concept of 
unconscious repression. Furthermore, he argued that previous survey research did not 
specifically assess unconscious repression. Here, we present critical evidence that runs counter to 
his claims. First, we inspected his co-citation analysis and found that some scholars ascribe to 
notions closely related to unconscious repression. Furthermore, we conducted another analysis 
based on papers’ similarity between each other. Again, we found examples of scholars 
specifically endorsing unconscious repressed memories. Second, contra Brewin, recent survey 
research now exists that bears directly on people’s beliefs regarding unconscious repression. This 
work reveals that large percentages of people (students and EMDR clinicians) endorse the 
concept of unconscious repressed memories. The belief in unconscious repressed memory can 
continue to contribute to harmful consequences in clinical, legal, and academic domains (e.g., 
false accusations of abuse).  
 










Belief in Unconscious Repressed Memory Persists 
In memory of our colleague and co-author, Scott O. Lilienfeld 
        In a previous review, we (Otgaar et al. 2019) concluded that the controversial issue of 
unconscious blockage of psychological trauma or repressed memory remains very much alive in 
clinical, legal, and academic contexts. In response to our claim, Brewin (in press) offered 
evidence that he argued is “incompatible” (p. xxx) with our conclusions. For example, Brewin 
claimed that few if any scholars refer to unconscious repression. Also, he asserted that survey 
research on repressed memories does not assess unconscious repression. Here, we present several 
lines of evidence indicating that the topic of repressed memory persists. 
As Holmes (1994) anticipated, the terminology used to describe repressed memories has 
changed and broadened greatly over time, as theorists and researchers have used a variety of 
terms (e.g.,  dissociation, dissociative amnesia, engrams, and body memories) as substitutes for 
the monolithic and often vaguely-defined term “repressed memory” to refer to the unconscious 
banishment of memories from consciousness. The latter terms do not necessarily convey whether 
“repressed memories” refer to the process or outcome of unconscious repression. Nevertheless, 
we will suggest that the general construct of unconscious repressed memories can be 
encompassed by diverse hypotheses and claims regarding memory, even though the exact term 
“repressed memory” is not invoked. 
 
What Do Scholars Mean by Repressed Memory? 
Recently, we presented evidence that many people in clinical, legal, and academic fields 
continue to believe in repressed memories (Otgaar et al., 2019). This belief lay at the heart of the 
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so-called “memory wars” of the 1990s (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). Based on converging 
research, we argued that the memory wars still endure in multiple quarters. According to 
repressed memory proponents, repression can involve the automatic and unconscious blockage 
of autobiographical experiences of trauma (e.g., sexual abuse). Furthermore, unconscious 
repressed memories can lead to physical and mental health problems, and recovery of the 
repressed memory is crucial to symptom relief (e.g., Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995).  As we 
observed (Otgaar et al., 2019), the scientific support for unconscious repressed memories is weak 
or even non-existent. In this respect, we find it encouraging that Brewin (in press) similarly 
appears to express skepticism regarding unconscious repression (see also Brewin & Andrews, 
2014). Apart from plausible alternative explanations for people not remembering trauma (e.g., 
encoding failures, ordinary forgetting, reinterpretation of traumatic experiences), a wealth of 
research demonstrates that traumatic experiences are not repressed, but actually well 
remembered (e.g., McNally, 2005). 
Brewin (in press) conducted a co-citation analysis to examine the major publications 
agreeing with the concept of repression. He argued that none of the papers detected in this 
analysis supported the controversial unconscious version of repression. He proceeded to 
conclude that in contrast to what we proposed, scholars do not endorse this unconscious variant 
of repression. However, there are several problems with Brewin’s analysis. First, although 
Brewin stated that none of the sources endorsed the unconscious variant of repression, this 
contention cannot be verified with the information he presented. More specifically, he presented 
only a table with the author names of books and articles without describing their content (e.g., 
writings on conscious suppression). Second, when we inspected the content of these sources, we 
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found clear evidence of references to unconscious repression and problematic assumptions 
related to the construct1. For example, Herman and Schatzow (1987) wrote that: 
“Patients were categorized as having severe memory deficits if they could recall very 
little from childhood, if they reported recent eruption into consciousness of memories that 
had been entirely repressed, or if this kind of recall occurred during the course of group 
treatment (p.4)“ 
These authors endorse the idea of unconscious repression (e.g., “eruption into 
consciousness of memories that had been entirely repressed”). Relatedly, although we agree with 
Brewin (in press) that “clinic evidence” (p. 1) shows that there are many types of memories 
elicited without suggestion, “clinic evidence” is no guarantee that recovered memories are true.   
As another example, Terr (1991) argued that  
“spontaneous dissociation” could underlie “amnesia for certain periods of childhood life” 
(p. 330).  
Here, one might quibble with whether repression is isomorphic with dissociation. Yet the idea of 
“spontaneous dissociation” is arguably indistinguishable from unconscious repression in which 
large blocks of experience are banned from memory. In addition, contrary to Brewin (in press), 
the notion of unconscious repression remains accepted by many scholars under the guise of 
dissociative amnesia in the influential Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; DSM-5). If readers examine the quotations we 
provided from the DSM-5 in our target article (Otgaar et al., 2019), they can see that dissociative 
amnesia “involves a period of time when there is an inability to recall important biographical 
                                                
1 We identified other references to unconscious repression and problematic assumptions related 
to repressed memory. For the sake of brevity, we have not included them in the manuscript text, 
but they can be accessed when following this link: https://osf.io/2yck8/  
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information” (p. 298) and “always potentially reversible because the memory has been 
successfully stored (p.298).  These statements again imply the unconscious version of repression. 
The inclusion of dissociative amnesia in the DSM—so tightly aligned with the concept of 
unconscious repression—may be one of the most important reasons why this debate is likely to 
extend for years to come.  
Furthermore, a limitation of co-citation analysis (as used in Brewin, in press) is that it 
only includes sources that cite each other. An alternative analysis, using the website 
https://www.connectedpapers.com, not only takes advantage of the principles of co-citation and 
bibliographic coupling, but also rearranges sources according to their similarity. The benefit of 
such an analysis is that it can encompass more sources related to unconscious repression. To 
conduct such an analysis, a paper identifier (e.g., doi, title) needs to be inserted after which a 
graph is created in which papers are visually displayed in terms of their similarity to the source 
in question. Our strategy was to include an identifier of a paper that contains problematic 
assumptions concerning repressed memory. We elected to use the widely cited (over 1700 
citations as of this writing according to the Google Scholar database) paper by Van der Kolk and 
Fisler (1995), which maintained that repressed memories of trauma can exert a physical toll. 
According to this body-keeps-the-score hypothesis, trauma can be “entirely organized on an 
implicit or perceptual level, without an accompanying narrative about what happened” (Van der 
Kolk & Fisler, 1995, p. 512). We selected this paper given that we used it prominently in our 
previous paper as an example of unconscious repressed memory (Otgaar et al., 2019; see also 
McNally, 2005). Figure 1 displays a visual representation of papers that share similarities with 
Van der Kolk and Fisler. We inspected these papers and, in contrast to Brewin (in press), found 
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clear indications that scholars referred to unconscious repression. For example, Van der Hart and 
Nijenhuis (1995)2 wrote that memory loss due to trauma:  
“involves a reversible memory impairment in which memories of personal experience 
cannot be retrieved in a verbal form, or, if temporarily retrieved, cannot be wholly 
retained in consciousness” (p.1).  
To give another example, Van der Kolk, Hopper, and Osterman (2001) postulated that:  
“traumatic memories persist primarily as implicit, behavioral, and somatic memories” 
(p.24).” 
There are also examples of scholars mentioning unconscious repression that were not part of our 
analysis. For example, Axmacher et al. (2010) argued that there are  
“two problematic cases involving extremely negative emotions: the emergence of an 
unconscious conflict, which is subject to repression, and traumatic events that overstress 
a person’s executive capabilities and thus lead to dissociation. As a result, conscious 
recall of these contents is impaired, but they continue to exert an unconscious effect 
which dramatically influences subsequent life – for example, by uncontrollably occurring 
intrusions and dissociative flashbacks, panic attacks, or psychosomatic symptoms (p.1)”. 
 
In sharp contrast with Brewin (in press), we find substantial evidence to the contrary and 
further contend that the concept is very much alive and will even likely endure in the future.  
Even though the terminology has seemingly changed over time (from repressed memory to 
dissociation and dissociative amnesia), the idea that a person can be physically or sexually 
                                                
2 In the graph, this paper was designated as Nijenhuis (2005) but refers to the paper by Van der 
Hart and Nijenhuis (1995). 
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abused, somehow unconsciously extirpate the disturbing experience from memory, and then 
recall it year later in pristine detail appears to have persisted. Problematically, scholars and 
clinicians who endorse a belief in unconscious repression might advocate for associated and 
problematic practices such as attempting to unearth repressed traumatic memories using 
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Figure 1. Graph of papers arranged according to their similarity. Darker colours are more 
recent papers while lighter colours represent older papers.    
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Surveying Unconscious Repressed Memory 
Many researchers have surveyed people from the general public, clinicians, students, and 
legal professionals regarding their beliefs in repressed memories (e.g., Magnussen & Melinder, 
2012; Patihis et al., 2014; Ost et al., 2017). When combining data from all surveys, we reported 
that the belief in repressed memories is widespread (58%; n = 4,745; Otgaar et al., 2019). Brewin 
(in press) criticized this research because it relied on a single questionnaire item to assess 
repressed memory (e.g., “Traumatic memories can be repressed for many years and then 
recovered”; Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001) that does not refer specifically to 
unconscious repression. 
There are several flaws in his criticism. First, contra Brewin (in press), several 
researchers have explicitly asked participants about their belief in unconscious repressed 
memory. For example, Houben and colleagues (2019) asked therapists who practice the widely 
used technique of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) whether “the mind is 
capable of unconsciously blocking out memories of traumatic events.”  EMDR is a highly 
popular intervention for posttraumatic stress disorder (Cuijpers et al., 2020). In two studies, 
Houben and colleagues showed that large percentages of small samples of EMDR therapists 
agreed with this statement (Study 1: 91.6%, 11/12; Study 2: 70.7%, 29/41). Second, Brewin 
referred to recent work that he and colleagues published (Brewin et al., 2019) asking participants 
to respond to two items concerning repressed memory, one that has frequently been used in 
previous work (“Traumatic memories can be repressed for many years and then recovered”) and 
one focusing on conscious repression (“Traumatic experiences can be deliberately blocked out 
for many years and then recovered”). Participants agreed to these statements at similar rates. 
Brewin and colleagues argued that one explanation for this finding was that participants actually 
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endorse a belief in conscious repression. In a recent study, we commented on Brewin et al.’s 
research as they did not specifically ask participants about their beliefs in unconscious repression 
(Otgaar, Wang, Howe, et al., 2020). We corrected this shortcoming and also surveyed 
participants (Study 1: N = 230; Study 2: N = 79) about their belief in unconscious repression. We 
found that many people endorse this belief (Study 1: 59.2%; 45/86; Study 2: 67.1%; 53/79).  
Furthermore, to examine more specific beliefs concerning the issue of repressed memory 
(e.g., whether repressed memories can lead to psychopathological symptomatology), we 
additionally surveyed people from the (French) general public (N = 1125) and provided them 
with more specific statements related to the topic of repressed memories. Of importance for this 
article, we presented them with statements such as “Unconscious repressed memories can cause 
mental health problems (e.g., depressive symptoms)”, “Unconscious repressed memories are 
memories of events that people are unaware that they happened to them”, “Unconscious 
repressed memories can be retrieved in therapy accurately”, and “When unconscious repressed 
traumatic memories cause mental health problems, it is necessary to recover the repressed 
memories to heal” 
 Participants had to rate these statements on a 6-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 2 
= disagree, 3 = slightly disagree 4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree). We found that 
91.6% (934/1020) of the participants agreed (i.e., provided ratings of 4, 5, or 6) that repressed 
memories can lead to mental health problems. Furthermore, we found that 51.9% (523/1008) of 
participants agreed with the statement that repressed memories concern memories of events that 
people are unaware of. Also, 55.6% (567/1020) of participants indicated that repressed memories 
can be accurately retrieved in therapy. Finally, 66% (661/1003) of the participants rated that the 
BELIEFS ABOUT REPRESSED MEMORIES 
 
 12 
recovery of repressed memories is needed to heal (for more information (e.g., demographics), 
see https://osf.io/n9fbg/).  
Third, in another recent study, we asked follow-up questions about what people mean 
when they endorse repressed memory (Otgaar, Wang, Dodier, et al., 2020; see 
https://osf.io/puzdy/). Specifically, we asked participants whether “Traumatic memories are often 
repressed.” If people agreed with this item, they received additional questions that checked 
whether they meant those traumatic memories are (a) accessible during repression and (b) 
unconscious during repression.	  We found that 89.5% (n = 909) agreed to some extent that 
traumatic memories can be repressed and of those, 73.7% (n = 670) agreed that such memories 
are inaccessible, and 80.9% (n = 735) agreed that such memories are unconscious. Both follow-
up questions’ results are strongly consistent with the controversial concept of unconscious 
repression. 
Taken together, the data show that many people believe in (unconscious) repressed 
memory. Even more, high percentages of students and perhaps clinicians, at least those who use 
EMDR, endorse notions highly consistent with unconscious repression. These beliefs lie at the 
heart of the memory wars and are strongly consistent with our conclusion that these wars are far 
from over (see also Otgaar et al., 2019).  
 
Memory Suppression and False Memories 
Contrary to Brewin’s (in press) assertions, we have shown that many scholars continue to 
refer to unconscious repression. Furthermore, large percentages of people endorse this concept 
(e.g., Otgaar, Wang, Howe, et al., 2020). Apart from problems concerning the notion of 
BELIEFS ABOUT REPRESSED MEMORIES 
 
 13 
unconscious repression, it is also important to discuss memory phenomena related to 
unconscious repression (i.e., memory suppression) and the memory wars (i.e., false memories).  
Specifically, a critical prong in the memory wars concerns the controversial idea that 
trauma can unconsciously block autobiographical experiences. However, an alternative variant of 
repression presumably happens through conscious control and is sometimes referred to as 
memory suppression or motivated forgetting (e.g., Anderson & Greene, 2001). Brewin and 
colleagues (in press) argued that memory suppression serves as a likely candidate for the 
forgetting of autobiographical memories and the recovery of them after many years. 
Nevertheless, no research has convincingly demonstrated memory suppression for 
autobiographical experiences in the laboratory (Otgaar et al., 2019), let alone for years or 
decades in everyday life. Furthermore, recent research suggests that memory suppression has 
been difficult to replicate (e.g., Bulevich et al., 2006). Adding to these doubts, Wessel, Albers, 
Zandstra, and Heininga (2020) conducted a multiverse analysis3 on several memory suppression 
experiments and failed to find evidence for consistent suppression effects. They concluded that 
their analysis: 
“raises problems for inhibition theory and its implication that repression is a viable 
mechanism of forgetting” (p.870).  
 Another important aspect of the memory wars is that legal cases have revealed that, in 
certain cases, the “recovery” of false memories of childhood abuse was the by-product of 
therapist suggestions that clients had repressed such memories (Loftus, 1993, 1994)4. A 
                                                
3 A multiverse analysis examines all possible and plausible analyses (i.e., universes) that exist for 
testing a certain hypothesis 
4 For a recent legal case on therapist-induced false memories, see 
https://www.news.com.au/world/shrink-implanted-false-memories/news-
story/46d8028131f321ca9143bf76f058b6d0  
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consequence of these legal cases was that memory researchers started to examine the conditions 
by which people could create autobiographical false memories. Loftus and Pickrell (1995) were 
among the first to show that people can be led to falsely believe and remember an 
autobiographical event that never happened.   
Brewin and colleagues (2020) criticized research using such paradigms by suggesting 
that only a “small minority” (p. 123) of participants are susceptible to false memory 
implantation. However, a recent review of false memory implantation studies showed that when 
transcripts of these studies were scored using a detailed coding scheme, 30.4% were classified as 
false memories and another 23% were classified as accepting the false event (Scoboria et al., 
2017). These percentages combined are surely not a small minority. Even setting aside these high 
percentages and the point that different implantation procedures might have led to different 
percentages, the crucial take-home message from memory implantation studies is that it is 
possible to make people falsely remember a non-experienced autobiographical event (Nash et al., 
2017; Smeets et al., 2017). Furthermore, recent research shows that false memory implantation 
occurs at similar rates for repeated and single occurring events (Calado et al., 2020).  
We are in agreement with Brewin (in press) that we must be careful not to discredit 
genuine cases of sexual trauma, and to take corroborated claims of such trauma seriously. 
Nevertheless, what are the dangers of dismissing evidence demonstrating that the memory wars 
are still being fought? A case in point concerns the time within which sexual abuse crimes can be 
prosecuted, also called the statute of limitation period. Recently, several European countries have 
extended or even abolished these limitation periods based on the premise that repressed 
memories exist (for an example of extension in France, see Dodier & Tomas, 2019). The 
rationale is that because traumatic experiences can make people unconsciously forget the 
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experience for decades, they cannot know of the crime until the “memory” is recovered in 
therapy or in everyday life. Therefore, because of unconscious repression, the statute of 
limitations cannot begin at the time of the alleged abuse or at a starting point set out in the law 
(e.g., 18th birthday), but must instead begin when the memory of that abuse is recovered. An 
adverse side effect of these abolishments or extensions of limitation periods is that they may 




We have shown, contrary to Brewin’s (in press) assertions, that (a) some major scholars, 
including contemporary authors, do continue to refer to the controversial phenomenon of 
unconscious repression and (b) large proportions of people, including students and EMDR 
clinicians, endorse unconscious repression (likely in the forms of the Freudian version, the DSM 
diagnosis of dissociative amnesia, or both). Such evidence suggests that the memory wars are far 
from over. The ongoing belief in unconscious repression (but also its ostensible conscious form) 
can be harmful in multiple contexts. For example, undergraduate and graduate psychology 
students informed that there is good evidence for unconscious repression may be inclined to use 
suggestive techniques to excavate purported repressed memories of abuse when they become 
practicing clinicians. As a second example, legal professionals (e.g., judges) who believe in 
unconscious repression may uncritically accept the claims of alleged victims of abuse reporting 
dissociative amnesia, in turn contributing to wrongful convictions. We hope that Brewin would 
agree with us that it is worthwhile to inform students, clinicians, and legal professionals about 
research that casts doubt on this phenomenon, including studies of retractors (i.e., people who 
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have repudiated earlier claims of being abused; e.g., de Rivera, 2000). Furthermore, we should 
draw their attention to case and experimental studies of how certain therapeutic techniques may 
inadvertently create false memories (e.g., Houben et al., 2020).   
In one of his papers, Brewin and colleagues (2020) warned of the dangers of 
“overenthusiastically championing conclusions based on limited data” (p. 125). We agree.  
Nevertheless, it can be at least equally dangerous to omit conclusions based on available data 
which reveals that the idea of unconscious repression continues to be accepted among many 
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